@.mhem2: يا أيها العزيز مسنا واهلنا الضر #ياصاحب_الزمان_ادركنا #العتبة_الحسينية_المقدسة #العتبة_العباسية_المقدسة #الشيخ_زمان_الحسناوي #followme

ثـارات آل محمد| MHEM
ثـارات آل محمد| MHEM
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Sunday 12 April 2026 09:53:22 GMT
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tabark.mh
Tabark Mh :
اللهم عجل لوليك الفرج💗 اللهم أغفر للمؤمنين والمؤمنات والمسلمين والمسلمات الاحياء منهم والأموات💚🌱
2026-07-05 00:10:42
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user42445917367617
العراقي العراقي :
اللهم عجل لوليك الفرج قريب
2026-09-09 16:38:09
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user2792718725037
♡«خِادٍمةّ صّآحًب الزمان عج» ♡ :
ياصاحب الزمان عج
2026-04-27 14:35:42
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.x7qm1
مهدي حيدر .🤍👑 :
العجل 💔
2026-04-12 11:00:23
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user9166729816614
سیدعباس حسینی :
❤️
2026-09-19 17:34:43
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user9166729816614
سیدعباس حسینی :
💔
2026-09-19 17:34:42
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user9166729816614
سیدعباس حسینی :
😭
2026-09-19 17:34:43
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_alaidani
ميࢪزا ؏ـمـاࢪ 🤍🌱 :
اللهم صل على محمد وآل محمد وعجل فرجهم ياكريم. نسألكم الدعاء
2026-04-22 19:31:08
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Seven Ethiopian armed and opposition movements have announced a new coalition against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party. The alliance—described as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival—brings together the Amhara Fano National Movement, Oromo Liberation Army, Tigray People’s Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front, Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement and Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement. Its declared objective is larger than demanding reforms. The coalition says it wants to remove the Prosperity Party government, establish an inclusive transitional administration under a transitional charter and begin a national constitutional dialogue. This is geopolitically significant because Ethiopia’s conflicts have previously been fought largely as separate regional wars. A coalition linking Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, the Somali Region, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz could force the federal government to confront political and security pressure across several fronts simultaneously. But an alliance on paper is not yet a unified army. No credible joint military command, financing structure, territorial strategy or agreed post-Abiy leadership has been publicly explained. The OLA has already described the arrangement as a “procedural consensus,” rather than a final agreement on Ethiopia’s fundamental political questions. Those disagreements are enormous. Fano and the TPLF fought on opposing sides during the Tigray war and still face competing territorial claims. Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan and Somali movements also hold different views on ethnic federalism, self-determination, regional borders and how much authority Addis Ababa should retain. Their strongest common position may simply be opposition to Abiy. The government still controls the national army, federal institutions, taxation, diplomacy and the machinery of the state. However, prolonged conflict in Amhara and Oromia, renewed tension around Tigray and wider economic pressure could make a coordinated opposition far more dangerous than seven disconnected rebellions. The consequences would extend beyond Ethiopia. Instability could affect Somalia if Ethiopia diverts troops and political attention away from regional security operations. ONLF participation could also revive sensitive questions concerning the Somali Region and self-determination. Eritrea will watch the Tigray dimension closely amid existing tensions with Addis Ababa and Ethiopia’s demand for reliable Red Sea access. Sudan’s war creates another vulnerable frontier, particularly around Benishangul-Gumuz. Egypt will calculate how instability could alter negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while Djibouti and Gulf investors will be concerned about Ethiopia’s trade corridors and access to the Red Sea. This does not prove that Ethiopia is about to collapse. It shows that opposition to Abiy is becoming more geographically connected. The decisive question is whether former enemies can build a coherent political settlement—or whether their alliance intensifies the very fragmentation it claims it can prevent. Is this the beginning of a national transition, a temporary alliance of convenience, or the opening stage of Ethiopia’s breakup? #Ethiopia #HornOfAfrica #Somali #Somaliland #EpiksNews
Seven Ethiopian armed and opposition movements have announced a new coalition against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party. The alliance—described as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival—brings together the Amhara Fano National Movement, Oromo Liberation Army, Tigray People’s Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front, Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement and Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement. Its declared objective is larger than demanding reforms. The coalition says it wants to remove the Prosperity Party government, establish an inclusive transitional administration under a transitional charter and begin a national constitutional dialogue. This is geopolitically significant because Ethiopia’s conflicts have previously been fought largely as separate regional wars. A coalition linking Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, the Somali Region, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz could force the federal government to confront political and security pressure across several fronts simultaneously. But an alliance on paper is not yet a unified army. No credible joint military command, financing structure, territorial strategy or agreed post-Abiy leadership has been publicly explained. The OLA has already described the arrangement as a “procedural consensus,” rather than a final agreement on Ethiopia’s fundamental political questions. Those disagreements are enormous. Fano and the TPLF fought on opposing sides during the Tigray war and still face competing territorial claims. Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan and Somali movements also hold different views on ethnic federalism, self-determination, regional borders and how much authority Addis Ababa should retain. Their strongest common position may simply be opposition to Abiy. The government still controls the national army, federal institutions, taxation, diplomacy and the machinery of the state. However, prolonged conflict in Amhara and Oromia, renewed tension around Tigray and wider economic pressure could make a coordinated opposition far more dangerous than seven disconnected rebellions. The consequences would extend beyond Ethiopia. Instability could affect Somalia if Ethiopia diverts troops and political attention away from regional security operations. ONLF participation could also revive sensitive questions concerning the Somali Region and self-determination. Eritrea will watch the Tigray dimension closely amid existing tensions with Addis Ababa and Ethiopia’s demand for reliable Red Sea access. Sudan’s war creates another vulnerable frontier, particularly around Benishangul-Gumuz. Egypt will calculate how instability could alter negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while Djibouti and Gulf investors will be concerned about Ethiopia’s trade corridors and access to the Red Sea. This does not prove that Ethiopia is about to collapse. It shows that opposition to Abiy is becoming more geographically connected. The decisive question is whether former enemies can build a coherent political settlement—or whether their alliance intensifies the very fragmentation it claims it can prevent. Is this the beginning of a national transition, a temporary alliance of convenience, or the opening stage of Ethiopia’s breakup? #Ethiopia #HornOfAfrica #Somali #Somaliland #EpiksNews

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