@nghuwgg: xênh chế @Cua làm gì ở HTIQUE? @HTIQUE #fyb #htique

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Tuesday 12 May 2026 07:57:53 GMT

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d hung w 🐸 :

sớm sớm

2026-05-12 08:00:49

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Hàn Boutique😍😘 :

🥰🥰

2026-05-12 09:30:31

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Japan, South Korea, and the United States all got rich by protecting their industries. Then they told poor countries to open theirs. The story goes like this: countries with cheap labor enter the free market, make shirts, get richer, lose the shirts, gain cars, lose the cars, and gain semiconductors and B2B SaaS. The World Bank built a playbook around it, and dozens of countries bet their development on the idea that their rung would keep rising if they played the game. But look at what those countries actually did. Japan protected its domestic market ferociously through the 1950s and 1960s behind tariff walls and keiretsu preferences. South Korea routed domestic demand through the chaebol, a captive network of firms with implicit state credit. The United States did it first and hardest, sheltering its manufacturers behind some of the highest industrial tariffs in the world from the 1810s through the 1890s, the protection Alexander Hamilton had prescribed as the first Treasury Secretary. In every case, export-led growth ran on top of a highly protected domestic market that home firms could dominate before facing global competition. The Washington Consensus told the countries that arrived after 1990 to skip that step. Compete globally on cost through open-market export platforms. No protection. No captive first market. And those countries lost their textile industries. Foreign Affairs puts China's excess exports in labor-intensive goods at roughly $355 billion a year: the developmental space poorer countries were told to compete for. Nigeria went from 350,000 textile workers in the early 1980s to below 20,000 by 2022. Chinese municipal governments still subsidize land, credit, and utilities for factories that could not survive a normal cost structure, and let them bid below cost because export rebates close the gap at year-end. The State Council told local governments to stop in March 2025. The behavior continues because local incentives have not changed. The developmental use of protection was ruled out for African countries by advice that Chinese firms never had to follow. That is the real asymmetry: not cheap labor versus expensive labor, but the fact that one set of countries was told to play by rules that the winners never actually played by.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States all got rich by protecting their industries. Then they told poor countries to open theirs. The story goes like this: countries with cheap labor enter the free market, make shirts, get richer, lose the shirts, gain cars, lose the cars, and gain semiconductors and B2B SaaS. The World Bank built a playbook around it, and dozens of countries bet their development on the idea that their rung would keep rising if they played the game. But look at what those countries actually did. Japan protected its domestic market ferociously through the 1950s and 1960s behind tariff walls and keiretsu preferences. South Korea routed domestic demand through the chaebol, a captive network of firms with implicit state credit. The United States did it first and hardest, sheltering its manufacturers behind some of the highest industrial tariffs in the world from the 1810s through the 1890s, the protection Alexander Hamilton had prescribed as the first Treasury Secretary. In every case, export-led growth ran on top of a highly protected domestic market that home firms could dominate before facing global competition. The Washington Consensus told the countries that arrived after 1990 to skip that step. Compete globally on cost through open-market export platforms. No protection. No captive first market. And those countries lost their textile industries. Foreign Affairs puts China's excess exports in labor-intensive goods at roughly $355 billion a year: the developmental space poorer countries were told to compete for. Nigeria went from 350,000 textile workers in the early 1980s to below 20,000 by 2022. Chinese municipal governments still subsidize land, credit, and utilities for factories that could not survive a normal cost structure, and let them bid below cost because export rebates close the gap at year-end. The State Council told local governments to stop in March 2025. The behavior continues because local incentives have not changed. The developmental use of protection was ruled out for African countries by advice that Chinese firms never had to follow. That is the real asymmetry: not cheap labor versus expensive labor, but the fact that one set of countries was told to play by rules that the winners never actually played by.

Future Trunks edit . . #tuff #trunks #blowthisupforme #edit #dragonball

Future Trunks edit . . #tuff #trunks #blowthisupforme #edit #dragonball

THIS helps prevent theft! #tipsandtricks

THIS helps prevent theft! #tipsandtricks

さとさんのライブにお邪魔しました #荒野行動 #livehighlights #tiktoklive #ヒカキンボイス @🐼ྀི☆超弱さと㌨☆荒野の光🐰ྀི🐼ྀི🍏ྀི

さとさんのライブにお邪魔しました #荒野行動 #livehighlights #tiktoklive #ヒカキンボイス @🐼ྀི☆超弱さと㌨☆荒野の光🐰ྀི🐼ྀི🍏ྀི

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