@pollar.news: Will your messages be scanned under the EU’s new rule? Not if they are end-to-end encrypted. But that is only one of two different measures commonly called “Chat Control.” On July 23, the Council gave final approval to a temporary regulation allowing online service providers to resume voluntary detection, reporting and removal of child sexual abuse material. It was published on July 28, entered into force on July 31 and applies until April 3, 2028. The rule excludes interpersonal communications protected, previously protected or intended to be protected by end-to-end encryption. “Chat Control” is not an official EU title. It is a political label often used for both this temporary measure and a separate permanent regulation that is still being negotiated. Parliament’s position rejects generalised scanning. It would permit targeted, time-limited detection orders authorised by a judicial authority, while excluding end-to-end encrypted communications and text messages. The Council’s position is different. It would make voluntary detection permanent and require providers to assess how their services could be misused, then introduce measures to reduce those risks. No final text has been agreed. The technical conflict remains. With end-to-end encryption, only the intended endpoints can read a message. The platform carries ciphertext and does not hold the keys needed to decrypt it. To inspect the content while leaving the encryption itself intact, software would have to check it before encryption or after decryption on an endpoint. That is client-side scanning: the lock remains, but the inspection point moves onto the device. This film separates what entered into force, what remains under negotiation and where content inspection would actually happen. Sources: Regulation (EU) 2026/1881; Council of the EU, July 23, 2026; European Parliament position, November 2023; Council general approach, November 2025. Current as of July 31, 2026. #ChatControl #Encryption #DigitalRights #EuropeanUnion #DataJournalism

WisdomWaves :

criminals will have other ways to communicate and we normal people are left with orwellian psychos' surveillance

DeclanTM :

Always wrapped as protecting children or preventing terrorism but it’s always about having as little privacy possible and as much control as possible of ordinary citizens.

ghostiilink :

find criminals? they have the epstein list. why dont they start by questioning those individuals first

Conacia :

let's not build an:

Drive With Me ! :

The problem is not ChatControl itself. It’s that it lays the ground for actual surveillance later. Once the foot is in the door, there is no turning back.

XTSWXITCHTX 🎧💿 :

Why dont we just believe women when they report instead of mass surveillance?

Mavgo :

I also don't know which criminals they are actually looking for. sure some higby is careless and texts over official messages. But what's with the big fish? they don't use WhatsApp or Telegram. heck they even use specialized smart phones.

Lipisintti :

The criminals aren’t using any mainstream messaging app if this comes, they’ll move to tor browser and stuff like that. The point of chat control is clearly something more sinister than ”protecting children”

sillykhunt :

I can guarantee the EU is already reading your messages

Maxisthis :

Yeah this already began btw

Kfndnslekbrv :

Wow, the sane take.

Invikta :

Smiles and Flames :

I don’t understand why only kids phones aren’t scanned, but everyone? If you write with a kid then you would know that your communication is transparent as it should be

777 :

Good luck

🩵🩵 :

Democracy they said

Crawling_it_ stagger :

bold of them to assume high-profile criminals would use any consumer-level messaging app; they probably use their own infrastructure

Pinuaple :

simplex app is so fucking giod

somebodycool7 :

so basically the same ish but planted on the phone i bought. even better

neo :

It’s to control us

LouieH98 :

Image hashing already exists. If all the detection does is compare image hashes to the known database then theres no issue. Your iCloud, Google cloud, snapchat, facebook, messenger, what app and most other sites already do this. IOS and Android both have the ability to do locally this however its disabled on both due to public outrage. Local checks of image hashes is the only possible method in my opinion of stopping CSAM. However the general public need to be advised of what exactly image hashes are and exactly how they work before such a feature can be turned on because otherwise the outrage will get it disabled again. all image hashing does is create a fingerprint for an image. You can compare the fingerprints to a database of known CSAM. Matches are reported. Non matches ignored. Without a hash to compare to its useless and you can’t recreate an image just with the fingerprint.

WRXCK :

I’m just going back to cyphers and pigeons

Friendly User :

What was that music underneath?

thrale :

patriot act european side